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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS "DETERMINATIVE STATUTE"
Plaintiff suggests that the Wyoming Survival Statute, rather than the Utah Survival
Statute, is applicable in this case. Opp. Brief at 3. Defendant disputes this assertion. In
construing an automobile insurance contract, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the
place of contracting, the place of performance of the contract, the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and the residence of the parties are all key factors in determining
choice of law. See American Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186
(Utah 1996). All of these factors favor the applicability of Utah law in this case. In any
event, the possible applicability of the Wyoming Survival Statute was never raised in the
trial court, and therefore cannot be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal.
Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1 f 13 n. 5, 40 P.3d 1155, 1159 n.5.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
Plaintiff accuses Hartford of attempting "to distort the factual record." Opp. Brief
at 6. This is a fairly serious allegation that is in no way supported even by Plaintiffs
Brief. The parties stipulated to many facts in the trial court for purposes of the parties'
cross motions for summary judgment. The simple fact is that there were many arguments
presented to the trial court that are not pertinent to this appeal. Therefore, Hartford did
not include each and every fact asserted below in its Brief, because not all facts apply
herein. For example, Plaintiff accuses Hartford of improperly omitting facts regarding
the following:
•

PIP and Med-Pay benefits that were previously paid by Hartford to Dorothy
Berkemeir. Opp. Brief at 8.
1

•

The "duplicate payment" provision of the Hartford policy. Opp. Brief at 9.

•

Ms. Berkemeir's demand for the full $100,000 UIM policy limit, and the
arbitration proceeding that was set up to resolve the claim. Opp. Brief at 9.

•

The Berkemeir Estate's settlement demand made after Ms. Berkemeir's
death. Opp. Brief at 9.
Significantly, Plaintiff never explains how these facts are pertinent to the appeal

before this Court. They are not. Moreover, Plaintiff inconsistently asserts that Hartford's
settlement offer is inadmissible and should not be included in the brief, all the while
chastising Hartford for not including Plaintiff's own settlement demands in its Statement
of Facts.1
"STRAW MAN" ARGUMENTS THAT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
Plaintiff makes various assertions that are irrelevant to the issues on appeal, and
seem calculated solely to play upon sentiment and sympathy. Hartford briefly addresses
these "straw man" arguments.

1

It may be noted that Plaintiff is incorrect in its assertion that Hartford's settlement offer
is wholly inadmissible under Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evidence. Opp. Brief at 7. Rule
408 prohibits admission of evidence of settlement negotiations, but only if admission of
such evidence is sought "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount."
Hartford has never attempted to disprove, or, of course, prove, its liability for Plaintiff's
UIM claim by presenting evidence that it once attempted to settle such a claim. Instead,
Hartford included that fact as merely one more background detail in this case.
Accordingly, the fact would not be inadmissible under Rule 408 where its admission was
not for an impermissible purpose.

2

1.

Plaintiff improperly contends that Hartford is unreasonable.

Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiffs personal injury claim exceeds the UIM limits of the
Hartford policy, and that Hartford is "unreasonable," (Opp. Brief at 8.), in refusing to
simply pay the limits of the policy to Plaintiff. These assertions have no basis in the
record below. Further, such contentions are irrelevant to the issue on appeal, which is
whether the Utah Survival Statute applies to the Plaintiffs claim for UIM benefits.
Although not material to this appeal, the fact is that settlement of this claim has been
attempted by both parties. Plaintiff apparently seeks to imply that Hartford never made a
significant settlement offer in order to prejudice the Court against Hartford.
2.

Plaintiff improperly contends that Ms. Berkemeir's injuries require
payment of the Hartford policy's $100,000 UIM limit.

Hartford vigorously disputes Plaintiffs assertion that it is clear that Ms.
Berkemeir's injuries justified payment of the full UIM limit. Opp. Brief at 10. Such a
wish on the Plaintiffs part is not a fact, as the precise value of the injuries was never
decided.

Further, the amount of general damages Ms. Berkemeir would have been

entitled to recover if she hypothetically had not died for reasons unrelated to her accident
is irrelevant. The only damages relevant in this appeal are her out-of-pocket expenses, as
the Survival Statute provides.
3.

Plaintiff improperly contends that Hartford has "breached" its
contract with Ms. Berkemeir by not paying the UIM policy limit.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts in its Opposition Brief that Hartford has "breached" the
insurance policy by not paying Ms. Berkemeir its UIM policy limit. See e^., Opp. Brief

3

at 20, heading. This argument contravenes settled Utah law. This Court has held that a
UIM insurer has no contractual obligation to pay UIM benefits until there is a legal
determination of the amount of the damages sustained. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

It is undisputed that no such

determination has been made in this case, because Ms. Berkemeir died prior to her
rescheduled arbitration.
4.

Plaintiff improperly implies that Hartford delayed the first scheduled
arbitration hearing.

Dorothy Berkemeir died of reasons unrelated to the car accident after the first
arbitration hearing was scheduled on July 21, 1997. Plaintiff states that the arbitration
was rescheduled "to allow Hartford to allow Hartford the opportunity to conduct an
Independent Medical Examination of Ms. Berkemeir," (Opp. Brief at 11), implying that
Hartford is responsible for the fact that this matter was not resolved by arbitration before
Ms. Berkemeir's death. Plaintiff, however, omits that Ms. Berkemeir failed to appear for
her independent medical examination as originally scheduled, which necessitated a
continuance of the arbitration hearing.

4

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs opposition brief clouds the fairly straightforward issues that apply in this
appeal. Rather than address Plaintiffs brief point by point, Hartford believes it more
helpful to address the issues in a straightforward and logical order.
A.

UIM COVERAGE AND HARTFORD'S CONTRACTUAL DUTIES

The first point to consider is the purpose of underinsured motorist (UIM)
coverage. The purpose of UIM coverage is to "provide protection to the insured against
damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in
the amount of the underinsured policy." 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 37,
Underinsured Motorist Coverage (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 845
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).2

This coverage, however, "is neither to guarantee full

compensation for a plaintiffs injuries nor to ensure that the claimant will be eligible to
receive the maximum payment available under any applicable policy . . . the public
policy" of UIM coverage is "to give a personal injury claimant access to insurance
protection to compensate for the damages that would have been recoverable if the
underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance." Id
With the purpose of UIM coverage in mind, the next logical step is to consider the
scope of Hartford's obligation to pay UIM benefits. Clearly, Hartford's duties toward the

2

As an example, assume that a plaintiff sustains $50,000 of damages in an automobile
accident, under circumstances where the tortfeasor who caused the accident only has
$25,000 in liability coverage. Under these circumstances, the injured person's own UIM
insurer will pay the $25,000 necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff for her injuries.

5

Plaintiff to pay UIM benefits are defined by the contract of insurance between Plaintiff and
Hartford. Id. at 196.3 The contract states that Hartford
. . . will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally
entitled to recover from the . . . operator of an underinsured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury . . .
(R. 72.)
Thus, Hartford is obligated to pay Plaintiff UIM benefits to the extent Plaintiff is "legally
entitled to recover" such benefits from the tortfeasor who caused the accident in question.4

3

Strangely, Plaintiff asserts that Hartford "now belatedly concedes" that their claim for
UIM benefits is based on a first party insurance contract. Opp. Brief at 14. Hartford,
however, has never denied the obviously contractual nature of the UIM claim. Plaintiffs
characterization may spring from its apparent misunderstanding of the nature of UIM
coverage: that while a UIM claim is clearly contractually based, such a claim necessarily
entails the contractual requirement that a claimant be 'legally entitled to recover,'
meaning that there is a viable underlying personal injury claim that is capable of being
reduced to a judgment. Plaintiffs misunderstanding here is illustrated by its misplaced
reliance on Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985), which Plaintiff
cites for the proposition that tort-related principles have no bearing on first party
insurance contracts. Opp. Brief at 15-16. In Beck, the court addressed the issue of what
the proper remedy for an insurer's breach of its duty to bargain in good faith with its
insureds in the first party insurance context. The court held that an insured who has been
the victim of an insurer's bad faith may have a cause of action against the insurer that
sounds in contract, but not tort. Id at 798-99. Beck's holding regarding the contractual
nature of a first party bad faith claim does nothing to undermine the settled legal principle
that proper UIM claims require a showing of a viable underlying personal injury claim.
4

Plaintiff's brief suggests that the phrase 'legally entitled to recover' is ambiguous and
that as such, it should be construed in to permit coverage. Opp. Brief at 21-22 (stating
that "if there is any argument over" whether the phrase permits Utah's Survival Statute to
apply to its claim for UIM benefits, "that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
Estate"). Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that "any argument" over the policy language
mandates a finding for the insured. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "policy
terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with
a different interpretation according to his or her own interests. . . . [instead, the
interpretation] must be plausible and reasonable. . . " S.W. Energy Corp. v. Continental
6

To be legally entitled to recover damages "from an underinsured tortfeasor, . . . the
insured must have a viable claim that can be reduced to judgment in a court of law. . .
show[ing] legal fault on the part of the allegedly uninsured motorist, damage to the insured,
and the un[der]insured status of the tortfeasor." 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 312
When is Insured "Legally Entitled to Recover" Damages so as to Qualify for Uninsured or
Underinsured Motorist Benefits. As this Court held in Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins.
Co., "[the UIM insurer's] obligation to perform, under the express terms of its contract with
... [the insured, does] not arise until there ... [is] a legal determination of the liability of the
[under-]insured motorist and the extent of the damages sustained... a judgment favorable to
[the insured] is necessary to fix [the UIM insurer's] contractual duty to satisfy that
judgment." 927 P.2d 192, 196 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) (quotations omitted). By definition,

Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). Without a showing of a
different, plausible, reasonable interpretation, this Court "interprets] the terms of an
insurance policy according to their plain meaning." Pollard v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
2001 UT App. 120 f 7, 26 P.3d 868, 870 (citations omitted). Moreover, "[m]ost courts
reason . . . that the language 'legally entitled to recover' is clear and unambiguous, and
that because the insurer stands in the shoes of the [underinsured] motorist, the claimant
cannot prevail against the insurer if the action against the uninsured motorist is barred."
Matarese v. New Hampshire Municipal Ass'n Property-Liability Insur. Trust, Inc., 791
A.2d 175, 181 (N.H. 2002); see also Ohavon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 747 N.E.2d
206, 214 (Ohio 2000) (stating that "legally entitled to recover" unambiguously means the
insured must be able to prove the elements of his or her claim against the tortfeasor.");
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dodson, 67 S.E.2d 505, 508 (Va. 1988) (finding "legally
entitled to recover" phrase unambiguous; holding that phrase "interposes, as a condition
precedent to the UM insurer's obligation, the requirement that the insured have a legally
enforceable right to recover damages from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle").

7

therefore, the amount of UIM benefits that a plaintiff is entitled to recover is a question to be
determined by a finder of fact.
This principle was made clear in Peterson, where this Court noted that "the insurance
company's obligation to perform, under the express terms of its contract with the insured,
did not arise until there was a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured motorist
and the extent of damages sustained." Id. at 195 (citing Lyon v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Beck
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n.l (Utah 1985)).
It is undisputed that such a legal determination of the precise extent of Ms.
Berkemeir's damages has never occurred. This is because Ms. Berkemeir died of causes
unrelated to her accident prior to the arbitration that was scheduled to conclusively resolve
this crucial issue.5
B.

THE ISSUE ON APPEAL

The above analysis brings us to the key question presented on this interlocutory
appeal: whether the Utah's Survival Statute, Utah Code Annotated §78-11-12, applies to the
Plaintiffs claim for UIM benefits. If the Survival Statute applies, the damages Plaintiff is
5

Plaintiff repeatedly accuses Hartford in its brief of "breaching" the insurance contract
because it did not pay its UIM limit of liability. See e^g. Opp. Brief at 12. Plaintiff even
implies that Hartford's alleged breach of contract has already been determined. These
arguments are disingenuous, and without any basis in fact or law. It is an undisputed fact
that the parties could not agree on what the Plaintiff was legally entitled to recover from
the tortfeasor, and such amount has never been determined by any finder of fact.
Accordingly, Hartford has not breached any agreement, nor can any breach even occur
until there is a determination regarding what Plaintiff is legally entitled to recover from
the tortfeasor whose negligence caused the accident. Peterson, 927 P.2d at 195.

8

entitled to recover from the tortfeasor are limited to "out-of-pocket expenses." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b). Conversely, if the Survival Statute does not apply to Plaintiffs
UIM claim, Plaintiff is entitled to seek recovery of all damages sustained in the accident,
including general damages, even though she could not have recovered those damages from
the tortfeasor.
Hartford's grounds for urging the Court to rule that the Survival Statute applies in
this action are briefed at some length in Hartford's moving brief. Hartford summarizes
herein the two key reasons why the Survival Statute must apply to the Plaintiffs claim for
UIM benefits.
1.

The language of the Survival Statute

First, and most important, the Survival Statute applies in this case because the
Plaintiffs claim arises from Ms. Berkemeir's personal injuries. The terms of the statute
provide that it applies to "causes of action arising out of personal injury." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-ll-12(l)(a) (emphasis added).
In construing this statutory language, it is this Court's "primary objective . . . to give
effect to the legislature's intent." Peterson, 927 P.2d at 1186 (citations omitted). Thus, the
Court "generally look[s] first to the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative
intent," and "will interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the
statute." Id. (citations omitted).

9

Application of these rules of interpretation makes clear that the Survival Statute
applies in this action, because the claim for UIM benefits necessarily "aris[es] out of Ms.
Berkemeir's "personal injuries" This Court has previously held that this precise phrase,
"arising out of," is unambiguous in the context of a commercial general liability policy.
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 190, <| 14, 27
P.2d 594, 597.
According to this Court's ruling in Meadow Valley Contractors, established law in
Utah provides the following definition for the phrase: "[T]he term 'arising out of is
ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident to, or in connection with the item
in question." Id. (citing Viking Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661, 663 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) (quoting National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)). This Court has further explained that the phrase "has
much broader significance than 'caused by,'" requiring only some type of "nexus" between
the event and the damage. Meadow Valley Contractors, 2001 UT App 190, f 14 (quoting
National Farmers Union, id.)
In this matter, Hartford and Plaintiff have a contractual relationship under which
Hartford is obligated to pay UIM benefits pursuant to the conditions specified in the policy.
The trial court erroneously ruled that the Survival Statute "does not apply to the facts of this
case because the Estate's claim is based on contract law rather than personal injury tort
law." (R. 190.) In light of the broad interpretation this Court has accorded to the phrase

10

"arising out of," it is clear that the trial court was simply wrong in ruling that the Survival
Statute does not apply to this UIM claim.
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs UIM claim is based entirely upon the personal
injuries Ms. Berkemeir sustained in her automobile accident. Further, there is no dispute
that the Hartford policy specifically premises the recovery of UIM benefits on "bodily
injury" that was sustained by an insured and caused by an accident. (R. 72.) Therefore,
there is clearly a relationship, or "nexus," between Ms. Berkemeir's personal injuries and
the UIM claim asserted against Hartford.

Indeed, the accident, and resulting injuries,

actually "caused" the UIM claim to occur, so to speak, although such causation is not
required under Utah law to determine that the Survival Statute applies in this case. See
Meadow Valley Contractors, id.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs UIM claim against
Hartford did not "arise out of personal injury . . . caused by the wrongful act or negligence
of another..." Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(l)(a). The judgment should be reversed.
2.

The illogical results of not applying the Survival Statute to UIM
claims.

In addition to the unambiguous statutory language, a hypothetical may illustrate the
simple logic that compels the conclusion that the Survival Statute applies to the Plaintiffs
claim for UIM benefits. Assume that the tortfeasor, James Alexander, who had liability
insurance through Allstate, had a policy with limits sufficiently high to pay for all damages
sustained by Dorothy Berkemeir. Further, assume that every other pertinent fact in this case
remains the same; in other words, Plaintiff and Allstate could not come to an agreement
11

regarding the Plaintiffs injuries, and Ms. Berkemeir died for reasons unrelated to the
automobile accident "prior to judgment or settlement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b).
Under these hypothetical circumstances, it is unquestionably true that the Survival
Statute would limit the plaintiff 's recovery against the tortfeasor, and hence Allstate, to
"out-of-pocket expenses." Similarly, if the tortfeasor had no insurance at all under the same
circumstances, the Survival Statute would limit any recovery by Ms. Berkemeir's estate
from the tortfeasor to "out-of-pocket expenses." In other words, it is clear that liability
insurers and self-insured, or uninsured, tortfeasors can take advantage of the damage
limitation imposed by the Survival Statute when the injured person dies for reasons
unrelated to the accident.
Perversely, under the trial court's ruling, only UIM insurers would be precluded
from applying the Survival Statute to limit damages when the Plaintiff dies before
judgement or settlement from causes unrelated to the automobile accident in question. This
arbitrary ruling, if extended to its logical conclusion, would result in unfair and inequitable
results, depending solely upon whether the injured person is "lucky enough" to be injured
by a tortfeasor with minimum or otherwise insufficient liability insurance limits.6 The law
cannot be so capricious, particularly in light of the language of the Survival Statute, which
applies by its plain terms to any and all claims that arise out of "personal injuries."

6

It would seem that the law should encourage people to purchase liability insurance with
higher limits, rather than lower limits.
12

C.

EXTRANEOUS ARGUMENTS REGARDING WHEN THE
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HARTFORD
ACCRUES

Plaintiff asserts various extraneous arguments regarding when Ms. Berkemeir's
claim accrued, and when the statute of limitations on the estate's claim began running. Such
arguments were accepted by the trial court, and relied on in the erroneous order that is
appealed from herein. Specifically, the trial court ruled that
. . . Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford accrued, and
the statute of limitations on her claim against Hartford began
running, on either the date of her settlement with Alexander or
upon Hartford's refusal to pay underinsured motorist benefits to
Berkemeir in breach of the insurance contract. Utah Code Ann,
§ 31A-21-313 sets forth the statute of limitations for bringing a
claim on an insurance policy, stating: "An action on a written
policy or contract of first party insurance must be commenced
within three years after the inception of the loss." The damages
would be measured as of the date of the breach of the contract,
when the cause of action accrued, and would not change based
on subsequent events.
(R. 193-94.)
This ruling appears to hinge on the erroneous premise that Hartford has "breached"
the insurance contract. Contrary to the trial court's assumption, Hartford has no legal
obligation to pay UIM benefits before there is "a legal determination of the . . . extent of the
damages sustained." Peterson, 927 P.2d at 196 (citation omitted). Therefore, there has been
no "breach of contract" upon which the cause of action could accrue.
Furthermore, the accrual of the claim and applicable statute of limitations, are
irrelevant to whether Utah's Survival Statute applies to limit Plaintiffs UIM claim. To
illustrate, consider again the hypothetical example cited above, in which the tortfeasor has

13

ample liability coverage to pay for the plaintiffs damages. Under such circumstances, the
plaintiffs cause of action accrues at the time of the accident, and the statute of limitations is
triggered by that event. If, however, the plaintiff dies before settlement or judgment from
causes unrelated to the accident, the Survival Statute would operate to limit her estate's
recovery to out-of-pocket expenses. Thus, the available recovery is altered based on the
plaintiffs subsequent death.
However, the trial court improperly ruled in this action that "[t]he damages would
be measured . . . when the cause of action accrued, and would not change based upon
subsequent events." (R. 194.) Consideration of the above hypothetical situation illustrates
the fallacy of the trial court's ruling. "Subsequent events" always change the recovery of
damages when the Survival Statute applies, because someone, by definition, has died.
Accrual of the cause of action, however, is irrelevant to the statute's operation and
applicability.7
D.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY HARTFORD

Finally, Hartford addresses the relief sought in this case. Hartford believes that the
Survival Statute applies to Plaintiffs UIM claim, and that this Court should reverse the trial
court's erroneous order that it does not. If this Court agrees with Hartford that the Survival
Statute applies to Plaintiffs UIM claim, the Court will then have two options. First, the

7

Hartford notes that under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-5(ll) (2000), causes of action for
UIM benefits accrue on "the date of the last liability policy payment." It is not clear if
this statute is a clarification of existing law, or if such statute creates new law. Either
way, the date of accrual, although interesting, is not controlling in any way on the
question of whether the Survival Statute applies in this action.
14

Court can simply remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings based on the
proper recognition that the Survival Statute will apply in this action. The second option is
for this Court to reverse the trial court's interlocutory ruling, and further, to enter judgment
in favor of Hartford. For the reasons discussed in Hartford's moving brief, Hartford submits
that this second option is entirely appropriate in the event the Survival Statute is found to
apply.
If the Survival Statute applies in this case, Plaintiffs recovery is limited to out-of pocket expenses. The maximum amount of those expenses is undisputed in the record, and
it is further undisputed that Dorothy Berkemeir already received from the tortfeasor's
insurer, Allstate, more than any possible amount of out-of-pocket expenses. Based on the
foregoing, Hartford submits that judgment should be entered in its favor on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hartford requests that the Court direct the lower court to
enter judgment in favor of Hartford. Alternatively, Hartford requests that the Court reverse
the trial court's erroneous order and remand this action to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with Survival Statute being operative in this action.

15

DATED this Z2

day of April, 2002.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

By
Mark L. Anderson, #5185
Anneliese L. Cook, #9117
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest
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Mark A. Larsen
Lisa C Rico
LARSEN AND MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir
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